One Act One Crime Rule

ONE ACT ONE CRIME RULE Illinois Supreme Court.

People v. Crespo, No. 86556 (February 16, 2001) Appeal, 1st Dist.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, Opinion filed February 16, 2001. Docket No. 86556, November 1999.

Where state charged stabbing of victim as one act in aggravated battery
based on great bodily harm count of indictment, and aggravated battery
while armed with dangerous weapon, as well as armed violence, three
strikes of knife to victim could give rise to only one conviction. A
careful review of the indictment in this case reveals that the counts
charging defendant with armed violence and aggravated battery do not
differentiate between the separate stab wounds. Rather these counts
charge defendant with the same conduct under different theories of
criminal culpability. The armed violence count of the indictment charged
defendant with committing aggravated battery against Arlene while he was
armed with a knife that had a blade of over three inches. Nowhere in
these charges does the State attempt to apportion these offenses among
the various stab wounds.

The aggravated battery counts charged defendant as follows:
"He, intentionally or knowingly without legal justification caused
bodily harm to Arlene Guerrero while using a deadly weapon, to wit: A
knife by stabbing Arlene Guerrero with said knife, in violation, of
Chapter 720, Act 5, Section 12–4–B(1), of the Illinois Compiled Statutes
1992, as amended, and He, in committing a battery on Arlene Guerrero
intentionally or knowingly without legal justification caused great
bodily harm to said Arlene Guerrero he stabbed Arlene Guerrero with a
knife, in violation, of Chapter 720, Act 5, Section 12–4–A of the
Illinois Compiled Statutes, as amended."

Therefore, convictions for aggravated battery is vacated.

State could have sustained three separate convictions had it charged
each strike of knife as separate offense. In People v. Dixon, 91 Ill.
2d 346 (1982), Illinois Supreme Court looked to People v. King, 66 Ill.
2d 551 (1977) interpreting the definition of an "act" narrowly. There,
it rejected the argument that striking the victim several times with a
club constituted a continuous beating and therefore a single physical
act. Rather, it held that the separate blows, although closely related,
constituted separate acts which could properly support multiple
convictions with concurrent sentences.